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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars 
in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge of the universe.  In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study 
the Red Planet’s upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is 
currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample 
of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis.  The success of these missions is enabled by 
mission assurance.  In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance.  The 
information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure.  NASA – 
like every other U.S. Federal Government agency – is required to manage the security of its 
information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that 
followed it.  Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal 
information security management takes a “one-size fits all” approach for protecting IT 
systems.  While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate 
into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions.  These 
systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument 
simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment.  They must be carefully 
configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions’ 
initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains 
operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet 
mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information 
system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations.  Certain protective 
measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment.  This 
is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified 
from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, 
OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few.  The security audits confirmed that 
the framework for managing information system security developed by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by 
NASA, is indeed effective.  However, the selection of the technical, operational and 
management security controls offered by the NIST model – and how they are implemented – 
does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in 
even though there is no apparent impact on mission success.  The authors observed that 
unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in 
protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security 
requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or 
non-existent protection.  This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that 
can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all.  It 
offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective 
without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed.  In 
addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential 
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impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act 
(FISMA) of 2014 – aimed at the enterprise – on the ground system, and offers other 
recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs). 
I. Introduction 
 
HROUGH various security assessments of NASA information systems, specifically systems supporting ground 
systems and mission operations (GS/MO), and through the day-to-day security service in support of these 
systems, the authors have observed an ever present conflict between security compliance and (actual) security risk 
reduction.  Some organizations3 that participated in these security assessments have displayed sole interest in 
compliance with security requirements over the actual reduction of information technology (IT) risks.  It is still a 
valid approach to security as being compliant will ensure the organization meets higher level requirements.  These 
higher level requirements aim to assure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information system.  
Unfortunately, some of these requirements are intended for the overall security of enterprise IT, and may not be 
necessarily appropriate for specialized systems such as those supporting the ground system and mission operations.  
In fact, meeting certain security requirements aimed at the enterprise at large may even pose new risks to these 
specialized systems and therefore to the missions.   
 
 Security compliance is a must, and is what security auditors check for, but being compliant is not the same as 
being secure.  Once security controls are in place, the identification, analysis, mitigation and tracking of risks – 
which are part of risk management activities – will actually provide the strongest protection to the information 
system provided they are performed on an on-going basis.  According to a March 2016 federal cybersecurity survey4 
by (ISC)2, “cybersecurity is quickly moving away from a ‘one size fits all’ set of standards, but the many 
compliance requirements do not allow for sufficient customization.”  For missions, this customization includes the 
tailoring of the security controls to better fit the unique environment in which they operate in.  Unfortunately, some 
organizations overlook the tailoring of the security controls which occurs in one of the early phases of the security 
life cycle5.  As a result, organizations try to make their information systems fit the controls and not the other way 
around as it should be.  During security assessments6, it becomes clear that the force-fitting of controls can have an 
impact on both compliance and risk reduction.  It is important to understand each step of the RMF including the 
SELECTION step in which the baseline security controls are tailored.  By tailoring the controls, the organization is 
ensuring that the most appropriate set of controls and control implementations are selected for the information 
system.  This also facilitates the implementation of the controls as well as the assessment of the controls, ultimately 
leading to an authorization to operate (ATO). 
 
 While this paper will not go over the tailoring process, it will enumerate some of the security controls that could 
be tailored for the ground system and mission operations based on the generic, almost universal ground segment 
architecture design and configuration.  The intent of the paper is to promote awareness of the tailoring process as 
well as to provide ISOs with an opportunity to reflect upon the selection of specific security controls that could be 
customized for the ground system and mission operations.  The recommended customizations provided are meant to 
illustrate and emphasize the rationale behind the tailoring of the controls so that ISOs can apply similar concepts 
early in the RMF implementation or as part of the continuous monitoring process. 
Scope 
 
The recommendations herein emanated from lessons learned from security assessments of federal information 
systems, in particular of elements comprising NASA ground systems.  The assessments were performed both prior 
to operations (i.e., prior to launch) and during operations.  Non-mission information systems (e.g., 
                                                          
3   Missions, projects, partners in industry and academia. 
4   “The State of Cybersecurity from the Federal Cyber Executive Perspective,”  (ISC)2 survey report [online], URL:  
https://www.isc2.org/uploadedFiles/(ISC)2_Public_Content/US_Government/ISC2-Federal-Cyber-Survey-
Report.pdf [cited 07 August 2016]. 
5   Step 2 of the NIST Risk Management Framework:  SELECTION. 
6   Step 4 of the RMF:  ASSESSMENT. 
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enterprise/corporate systems) were out of scope of the assessments.  Nonetheless, organizations that have adopted or 
that are in the process of adopting the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) could benefit from the focus of 
this paper, specifically through the reviews of the rationale for each of the recommended tailoring proposed herein.  
ISOs from non-federal information systems could also benefit from this discussion if they have or will be adopting 
the RMF, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, or other risk model.  Regardless, ISOs must fully understand the 
mission, the environment in which the mission operates in, and the resources available to them so the tailoring 
process is completed successfully and effectively. 
Assumptions 
 
The focus of this paper is on the selection and implementation of (NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 revision 
4 MODERATE7) security controls  as part of the NIST RMF.  The authors assume that other steps of the security 
life cycle are performed correctly.  It is also assumed that the RMF model and its security controls8 will change over 
time; however, the selection and implementation rationale may remain the same.  The authors assume organizations 
have resources for the management and the support of information security, and have a working knowledge of the 
federal information security life cycle.  Also, the elements that are mentioned throughout the paper are entities that 
comprise the ground system, and are operated by organizations.  These organizations are NASA centers, NASA 
projects/missions, laboratories, universities, private companies, etc. 
Disclaimer   
 
While many organizations perform some customization/tailoring of security controls, some still oversee this 
important step of the security life cycle from the RMF.  This paper intends to identify a few of the security controls 
that may be considered to be tailored to better protect and support the ground segment with focus on mission 
development and operations.  Just like the idea of having a one size fits all for enterprise IT security brings 
challenges and concerns, the recommended tailoring proposed herein may not fit all like environments, and must be 
analyzed prior to implementation.  In other words, these are only recommendations for customization; in fact, these 
recommendations are intended for ISOs of elements supporting the ground segment to consider when selecting the 
security controls for their information systems.   
 
This is not a recipe for selecting and implementing security controls, but rather considerations for reference.  
Also, organizations should not be limited to the controls in the NIST SP 800-53 catalog9.  Consider other security 
controls if applicable and as necessary.  Finally, throughout this paper, some illustrations from actual security 
assessment findings will be provided to assist in the understanding of a given point.  These cannot be traced back to 
any specific organization as such information is kept confidential for the protection of the assessed organization. 
 
II. The Ground System 
 
The ground system is comprised of multiple elements, each responsible for a specific aspect of the mission:  
Mission operations, science operations, ground stations, launch site, etc.  Each element may be operated by a 
different organization (NASA centers, universities, laboratories, corporations).  Needless to say, each element, and 
the mission network(s) connecting them are and must remain protected from unauthorized access and disruption.  
Most mission-agnostic elements such as ground stations, mission network service providers, launch service 
providers, etc. are already highly compliant with federal security requirements.  Non-mission-agnostic elements 
such as Mission Operations Centers (MOCs), Science Operation Centers (SOCs), and Instrument Team Facilities 
(ITFs) may barely be compliant with federal security requirements, and these are the elements that the authors aim 
to reach with this publication. 
                                                          
7   Most missions information systems are categorized as MODERATE. 
8  As of the time of this writing, the controls were from the NIST SP 800-53 revision 4 security control catalog. 
9 NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations 
[online], URL:  http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf  [cited 12 August 2016]. 
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III. The Security Life Cycle 
 
The Risk Management Framework (RMF) is a 6-step cycle aimed at selecting, applying, and verifying the 
appropriate security controls to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability assurance to federal information 
systems, and continuously monitoring the effectiveness of these controls.  The level of protection required to 
provide confidentiality, integrity and availability assurance to the information system will depend on the value of the 
data/information to be protected.  Therefore, the security life cycle begins with the categorization of the data based 
on the type of information.  The output of the categorization process, described in SP 800-60 and Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199, is either LOW, MODERATE or HIGH security rating.  For each 
rating, NIST provides security control baselines that can be tailored during the selection step of the security life 
cycle.  Most of the baselined security controls from catalog are acceptable by organizations to meet minimum 
security requirements.  After the controls are implemented, they must be assessed to verify compliance and 
effectiveness.  After the implementation evaluation results and residual risks are reviewed and accepted, the 
information is ultimately authorized to operate.  Once the information system is authorized, it must be continuously 
monitored to ensure controls are still applicable, relevant and effective.  A description of each RMF step can be 
found in chapter 3 of NIST SP 800-3710. 
 
 
Table I  The 6-step NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
 
NIST Risk Management Framework 
 
 Step 1:  CATEGORIZE Information Systems (FIPS 199/SP 800-60) 
 Step 2:  SELECT Security Controls (FIPS 200/SP 800-53) 
Step 3:  IMPLEMENT Security Controls (SP 800-160) 
Step 4:  ASSESS Security Controls (SP 800-53A) 
Step 5:  AUTHORIZE Information Systems (SP 800-37) 
Step 6:  MONITOR Security Controls (SP 800-137) 
 
 
IV. The Tailoring Process 
 
Organizations implementing the NIST RMF can certainly benefit from the security in-depth (layered) approach 
that the model offers, in particular by the technical, operational and management controls from the NIST baseline 
security control catalog.  Because of the interdependencies between the controls, it is advisable to not only select as 
many controls as applicable to the security rating11 of the system but also fully implement them if at all possible.  
When it is not possible to fully implement the controls as recommended by NIST even when the controls are 
applicable to the system, then is its necessary to customize the controls. 
 
Tailoring of the controls is necessary to avoid force-fitting them to support the unique environment and 
operations of the ground system.  This important step of the SELECTION phase can assist in the understanding and 
implementation of the controls as well as facilitate the assessment of the controls. 
 
                                                          
10 NIST SP 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems A 
Security Life Cycle Approach [online], URL:  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-
final.pdf [cited 12 August 2016]. 
11  Security Categorization 
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The tailoring process is summarized as follows: 
 
 
Table 2  The Tailoring Process 
 
 
 Identify and designate common controls in initial security 
control baselines; 
 
 Apply scoping considerations to the remaining baseline 
security controls; 
 
 Select compensating security controls (if needed) 
 
 Assign specific values to organization-defined security 
control parameters via explicit assignment and selection 
statements; 
 
 Supplement baselines with additional security controls and 
control enhancements (if needed); and 
 
 Provide additional specification information for control 
implementation (if needed). 
 
 
 
For a description and explanation of the tailoring process, see section 3.2 of NIST SP 800-53 Revision 412. 
 
Tailored controls need to be documented in the system security plan (SSP), and verification systems (e.g., 
vulnerability scanners) configured accordingly.  The idea is to document deviations in support of not only the 
implementation of the controls but in the verification of the controls during the security assessment and continuous 
monitoring steps. 
V. Tailoring Select Security Controls by Key Security Groups 
 
Once security controls are selected from the NIST SP 800-53 catalog (step 2 of the Risk Management 
Framework security lifecycle), the organization must determine its Organization-Defined Values (ODVs).  Without 
these values, projects have little or no implementation guidance.  Also, without these, audits can become very 
challenging as one cannot verify a requirement is being met if the requirement is only partially defined. 
 
Organizations must ensure that policies are in place for all security control families.  These are the first controls 
of each security control family in the catalog (“XX-1 controls” where XX is the abbreviation of the security control 
family).  Like ODVs, policies must be well defined, accessible, understood, and auditable or else they cannot be 
followed and/or enforced.  Unfortunately, some policies are not tailored enough for the ground system and mission 
operations environment.  At times, they are not tailored at all for such environment making it difficult to implement 
and assess13. 
 
                                                          
12  NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations 
[online], URL:  http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf  [cited 12 August 2016]. 
13   Subsequent steps 3 and 4 of the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF). 
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The following is a collection of candidate controls to be tailored for the highly specialized systems supporting 
ground system and mission operations.  Each control family has been grouped under the following security groups: 
 
A.  ACCESS CONTROL 
B.  CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
C.  MAINTENANCE AND MONITORING 
D.  MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT 
 
 These groups (not to be confused with the security control families of the same/similar names) are aligned with 
the key security groups proposed by Takamura et. al.14 when implementing and assessing critical elements such as 
Mission Operations Centers (MOCs). 
  
 This compilation is a result of observed patterns from various security assessments performed on NASA ground 
systems and mission operations, and they do not reflect the current implementation of a single or multiple 
information systems.  The intent is not to show how controls are being implemented but rather how it could be 
implemented taking into consideration the environment, the nature of operations, the processes that must be 
followed, etc. 
 
Each control is listed as a table organized as following: 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY 
Security Control Title 
(XX-NN) 
 
(Where XX is the security control 
family abbreviation, and NN is the 
security control number) 
NIST: 
Excerpt or entire control description. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Excerpt or entire supplemental guidance for the control. 
Reality:   
Description of the environment, the nature of operations, the processes that must 
be followed, etc. to substantiate the deviation and re-standardization of the control 
implementation. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Suggested deviation and re-standardization of the control based on the above 
considerations. 
 
A. Access Control 
 
ACCESS CONTROL 
Separation of Duties 
(AC-05) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Separates [organization-defined duties of individuals]; (b) 
documents separation of duties of individuals; and (c) defines information system 
access authorizations to support separation of duties. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and 
helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion.  Separation of 
duties includes, for example:  [..] (iii) ensuring security personnel administering 
access control functions do not also administer audit functions. 
                                                          
14   Takamura, E., Mangum, K., Wasiak, F., Gomez-Rosa, C., “Information Security Considerations for Protecting 
NASA Mission Operations Centers (MOCs),” 2015 IEEE Aerospace Conference, URL:  
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7119207 [cited 14 August 2016]. 
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Reality:   
In order to reduce costs, missions/projects assign some of the IT security roles and 
responsibilities to IT support personnel, which makes it difficult to observe the 
principle of separation of duties.  The review of audit logs by System 
Administrators (SAs), for instance, could be viewed as a risk since SAs have 
elevated privileges on the system, thus the capability to delete audit records.  
Adding the role of audit log reviewers to SAs may be inevitable due to limited 
mission/project budget during operations and especially during extended mission 
life.    
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
If separation of duties is not possible, assign mission support personnel to perform 
random inspections/verifications to ensure privileges are not being misused or 
abused. 
Unsuccessful Login Attempts 
(AC-07) 
NIST: 
The information system:  (a) Enforces a limit of [organization-defined number] 
consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a [organization-defined time 
period]; and (b) automatically [locks the account/node for an [organization-
defined time period] | locks the account/node until released by an administrator | 
delays next logon prompt according to [organization-defined delay algorithm]] 
when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
[..] Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by 
information systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a 
predetermined time period established by organizations. 
Reality: 
Many of the ground system elements operate in a multi-user environment.  
Terminals cannot afford to be locked by a given operator (or even the unlikely 
unauthorized user) after a number of unsuccessful login attempts occur. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
To prevent accidental (or intentional) denial of service by any of the multiple 
operators (or by hackers), especially after a password is changed, but to meet the 
intent of the control, set the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is set to a 
high number.  For instance, instead of 10 failed attempts, set it to 50 or 100.  This 
is only “safe to do so” if compensating controls are in place (e.g., segregated 
logical and physical environments each with controlled access). 
System Use Notification 
(AC-08) 
NIST: 
The information system:  (a) Displays to users [organization-defined system use 
notification message or banner] before granting access to the system that provides 
privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive 
Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance [..]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners 
displayed before individuals log in to information systems.  System use 
notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users and 
are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. 
Reality: 
Certain organizations have mandated that security warning labels be physically 
affixed to network printers.  While it is possible to configure network printers to 
authenticate users, most of the printers supporting the GS/MO are not set-up to do 
so.  For printers with a web user interface (WebUI), it may not be possible to edit 
the UI to display a security warning banner on the authentication/login page.  
Network printers within the LAN are protected by access controls. 
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Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
The intent of the control is to notify remote and local users – attempting to be 
authenticated – of the conditions and restrictions for accessing the device.  Since 
access to network printers within the LAN does not require authentication, and 
because of the inability for proprietary web pages in the WebUI to be edited, the 
installation of banners on these devices can/should be waived.  Compensating 
controls include segregated logical and physical environments each with 
controlled access. 
Session Lock 
(AC-11) 
NIST: 
The information system:  (a) Prevents further access to the system by initiating a 
session lock after [organization-defined time period] of inactivity or upon 
receiving a request from a user; and (b) retains the session lock until the user 
reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move away 
from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out 
because of the temporary nature of their absences.  Session locks are implemented 
where session activities can be determined.  This is typically at the operating 
system level, but can also be at the application level.  Session locks are not an 
acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example, if 
organizations require users to log out at the end of the workdays. 
Reality: 
Some devices display information that require continuous viewing, and 
cannot/should not have sessions locked since it would defeat the purpose of the 
device. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Identify the devices that cannot/should not have sessions locked; disable session 
locks on these devices; and remove/waive requirement from them.  Compensating 
controls include segregated logical and physical environments each with 
controlled access. 
Session Lock | Pattern-
Hiding Displays 
(AC-11(1) 
NIST: 
The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously 
visible on the display with a publicly viewable image. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance:  
Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamics images, for example, 
patters used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery 
life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images 
convey sensitive information. 
Reality: 
Some devices display information that require continuous viewing, and 
cannot/should not have sessions locked since it would defeat the purpose of the 
device. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Identify the devices that cannot/should not have sessions locked; disable session 
locks on these devices; and remove/waive requirement from them.  Compensating 
controls include segregated logical and physical environments each with 
controlled access. 
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Session Termination 
(AC-12) 
NIST: 
The information system automatically terminates a user session after 
[organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast 
to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are 
associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). 
Reality: 
Some devices display information that require continuous viewing, and 
cannot/should not have sessions terminated since it would defeat the purpose of 
the device. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Identify the devices that cannot/should not have sessions terminated; disable 
automatic session termination on these devices; and remove/waive requirement 
from them.  Compensating controls include segregated logical and physical 
environments each with controlled access. 
Wireless Access 
(AC-18) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection 
requirements, and implementation guidance for wireless access; and (b) authorizes 
wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio (UHF/VHF), 
802.11x, and Bluetooth.  Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g., 
(EAP/TLS, PEAP), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication. 
Reality: 
No Wi-Fi in support of operations. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select control if Wi-Fi is not supported or permitted. 
Publicly Accessible Content 
(AC-22) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a 
publicly accessible information system; (b) trains authorized individuals to ensure 
that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information; (c) 
reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly 
accessible information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not 
included; and (d) reviews the content on the publicly accessible information 
system for nonpublic information [organization-defined frequency] and removes 
such information, if discovered. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 
regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized to 
nonpublic information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and 
proprietary information).  This control addresses information systems that are 
controlled by the organization and accessible to the general public, typically 
without identification or authentication.  The posting of information on non-
organization information systems is covered by organizational policy. 
Reality: 
With the exception of data archiving elements, GS/MO elements do not offer 
publicly accessible content. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select control if no publicly accessible content is offered. 
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IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA) 
Identification and 
Authentication | Acceptance 
of PIV Credentials 
IA-02(12) 
 
 
NIST: 
The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity 
Verification (PIV) credentials. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control enhancement applies to organizations implementing logical access 
control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS).  Personal 
Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal 
agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance 
documents.  OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue 
implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use 
of PIV credentials. 
Reality:   
The ground system is often comprised of elements operated by government, 
industry and academia.  There is no federated solution for deploying personal 
identification verification (PIV) cards across the ground system to identify and 
authenticate users from all elements.   
 
Also, many of the ground system elements operate in a multi-user environment in 
which a single (group) account is needed so sessions span multiple shifts. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select the control if PIV credentials cannot be utilized. 
Identification and 
Authentication | Acceptance 
of PIV Credentials From 
Other Agencies 
(IA-8(1)) 
NIST: 
The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity 
Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control enhancement applies to logical access control systems (LACS) and 
physical access control systems (PACS).  Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 
credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS 
Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents.  OMB Memorandum 11-11 
requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in 
HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials. 
Reality: 
The ground system is often comprised of elements operated by government, 
industry and academia.  There is no federated solution for deploying personal 
identification verification (PIV) cards across the ground system to identify and 
authenticate users from all elements and from other agencies. 
 
Also, many of the ground system elements operate in a multi-user environment in 
which a single (group) account is needed so sessions span multiple shifts. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select the control if PIV credentials from other agencies cannot be utilized. 
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PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Physical Access Control 
(PE-03) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Enforces physical access authorizations at [organization-
defined entry/exist points to the facility where the information system resides] by:  
(1) verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; 
and (2) controlling ingress/egress to the facility using: [[organization-defined 
physical access control systems/devices] | guards]; (b) maintains physical access 
audit logs for [organization-defined entry/exit points]; (c) provides [organization-
defined security safeguards] to control access to areas within the facility officially 
designated as publicly accessible; (d) escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity 
[organization-defined circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring]; (e) 
secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices; (f) inventories 
[organization-defined physical access devices] every [organization-defined 
frequency]; and (g) changes combinations and keys [organization-defined 
frequency] and/or when keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or 
individuals are transferred or terminated. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control applies to organizational employees and visitors.  Individuals (e.g., 
employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization 
credentials are not considered visitors. [..]  Physical access devices include, for 
example, keys, locks, combinations, and card readers.  Safeguards for publicly 
accessible areas within organizational facilities include, for example, cameras, 
monitoring by guards, and isolating selected information systems and/or system 
components in secured areas.  Physical access control systems comply with 
applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, 
standards, and guidance.  [..] 
Reality:   
Many of the ground system elements (both NASA internal and NASA external 
information systems) operate in a multi-user environment where the same 
facilities are physically shared with multiple missions/projects.  These elements 
are often located inside secure facilities, some of them are certified by the 
Department of Defense. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
If same physical facilities are shared with multiple projects/missions, perform risk 
assessment, but ensure intent of the control is observed/followed.  Special 
attention should be given to individual mission/project access requirements, and 
whether the shared resources (facilities) could incur any unacceptable risks to 
individual missions/projects.  Compensating controls may focus on personnel 
security, monitoring, and other pertinent physical security measures. 
 
Comments: 
Generally, missions/projects fare very well in the physical security aspect, 
especially if the organization is engaged in defense work such as the case of many 
of the laboratories with federal government contracts.  Laboratories often 
demonstrate stronger physical security than universities. 
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B. Configuration Management 
 
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
Baseline Configuration 
(CM-02(2)) 
NIST: 
The organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, 
complete, accurate, and readily available baseline configuration of the information 
system. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistent baseline 
configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and 
software inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network 
management tools. [..] 
Reality:   
Many elements are still manually configuring systems (this control enhancement 
is not selected for MODERATE systems). 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Although this control enhancement is not selected for MODERATE systems, 
elements should consider using automation for maintaining baseline 
configurations.  Many organizations have successfully implemented virtualized 
environments that provide effective and easy to use tools for automating certain 
CM processes such as baseline configuration maintenance. 
Baseline Configuration | 
Configure Systems, 
Components, or Devices for 
High-Risk Areas 
(CM-02(7)) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Issues [organization-defined information systems, system 
components, or devices] with [organization-defined configuration] to individuals 
traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and (b) 
applies [organization-defined security safeguards] to the devices when the 
individuals return. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
When it is known that information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., 
notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, additional 
security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas 
coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled 
areas. [..] 
Reality:   
Mobile devices are rarely utilized for operations.  When they do, it is mostly for 
internal work, and they do not leave the premises. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select control if devices do not leave the premises. 
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Configuration Change 
Control 
(CM-03) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Determines the types of changes to the information system 
that are configuration-controlled; (b) reviews proposed configuration-controlled 
changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with 
explicit consideration for security impact analyses; (c) documents configuration 
change decisions associated with the information system; (d) implements 
approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system; (e) retains 
records of configuration controlled-changes to the information system for 
[organization-defined time period]; (f) audits and reviews activities associated 
with configuration-controlled changes to the information system; and (g) 
coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities 
through [organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., 
committee, board] that convenes:  [[organization-defined frequency] | 
[organization-defined configuration change conditions]]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Configuration change controls for organizational information systems involve the 
systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition 
of changes to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications.  
Configuration change control includes changes to baseline configurations for 
components and configuration items of information systems, changes to 
configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., operation 
systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), 
unscheduled/unauthorized changes, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities.  [..] 
Reality: 
Some organizations overkill project-level Change Control Boards (CCBs) with 
low-level routine IT work that could be handled by a dedicated and specialized IT 
CCB. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Establish a dedicated and specialized IT CCB to handle low-level routine IT work, 
but continue to engage project-level CCB for all other changes. 
Security Impact Analysis 
(CM-04) 
NIST: 
The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine 
potential security impacts prior to change implementation. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., 
Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, 
Information System Security Managers, and Information System Security 
Engineers) conduct security impact analyses. [..] 
Reality: 
Not enough SIA is performed. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Incorporate SIA into change request and maintenance processes. 
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Configuration Settings 
(CM-06) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Establishes and documents configuration settings for 
information technology products employed within the information system using 
[organization-defined security configuration checklists] that reflect the most 
restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements; (b) implements the 
configuration settings; (c) identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from 
established configuration settings for [organization-defined information system 
components] based on [organization-defined operational requirements]; and (d) 
monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with 
organizational policies and procedures. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, 
software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the 
security posture and/or functionality of the system.  [..]  Common secure 
configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown and 
hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation 
guides) provide recognized, standardized and established benchmarks that 
stipulate secure configuration settings for specific information technology 
platforms/products and instructions for configuring those information system 
components to meet operational requirements.  [..] Common secure configurations 
include the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [..] The 
Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the defined standards within 
the protocol. 
Reality: 
Some organizations are still manually configuring devices, making it a time-
consuming and laborious effort. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Configure settings using automated protocols, preferably those that have been pre-
configured by the organization (and with deviations and justifications already 
documented). 
Information System 
Component Inventory 
(CM-08) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Develops and documents an inventory of information 
system components that:  (1) accurately reflects the current information system; 
(2) includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information 
system; (3) is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and 
reporting; and (4) includes [organization-defined information deemed necessary to 
achieve effective information system component accountability]; and (b) reviews 
and updates the information system component inventory [organization-defined 
frequency]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system 
component inventories that include components from all organizational 
information systems. 
Reality: 
Some organizations are still manually inventorying assets, making it a time-
consuming and laborious effort. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Credentialed vulnerability scan reports, if configured appropriately, may provide 
an automated method for obtaining information system component inventories. 
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MEDIA PROTECTION 
Media Marking 
(MP-03) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Marks information system media indicating the distribution 
limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the 
information; and (b) exempts [organization-defined types of information system 
media] from marking as long as the media remain within [organization-defined 
controlled areas]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable security 
attributes.  [..] 
Reality:   
Some organizations utilize automated media handling hardware (e.g., tape drives, 
robotic media handlers, etc.) which may be sensitive to labels (e.g., SBU labels) 
affixed to the media that could potentially damage the hardware. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Apply labels to protective case/enclosure or, if not possible (e.g., large volume of 
library), affix poster with markings to entry/exit point (i.e., storage door).  
Compensating control may include conditions and restrictions under which the 
media leaves (or not) the facility. 
 
 
SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION 
Network Disconnect 
(SC-10) 
NIST: 
The information system terminates the network connection associated with a 
communications session at the end of the session or after [organization-defined 
time period] of inactivity. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control applies to both internal and external networks.  Terminating network 
connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-
allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or 
de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple 
application sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. 
Reality: 
Most terminals cannot/should not be disconnected from the network at the end of a 
sessions or after a pre-determined period of inactivity. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Identify the devices that cannot/should not be disconnected from the network 
(which is basically all of the assets); and remove/waive requirement from them.  
Compensating controls include segregated logical and physical environments each 
with controlled access. 
Cryptographic Protection 
(SC-13) 
NIST: 
The information system implements [organization-defined cryptographic uses and 
type of cryptography required for each use] in accordance with applicable federal 
laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions 
including, for example, the protection of classified and Controlled Unclassified 
Information, the provision of digital signatures, and the enforcement of 
information separation when authorized individuals have the necessary clearances 
for such information but lack the necessary formal access approvals. [..] 
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Reality: 
Some elements utilize insecure protocols (e.g., FTP) when uploading non-
sensitive data to an archive.  The argument provided is that the data is not 
sensitive, and therefore does not need to be encrypted. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Regardless of whether the data being transferred is sensitive or not, the user 
performing the uploading of the data needs to be authenticated, and the credentials 
utilized must be protected.  Else, they can be sniffed, and acquired by anyone 
listening to the network(s) between the client and the server. 
Collaborative Computing 
Devices 
(SC-15) 
NIST: 
The information system:  (a) Prohibits remote activation of collaborative 
computing devices with the following exceptions:  [organization-defined 
exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; and (b) provides an explicit 
indication of use to users physically present at the devices. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white boards, 
cameras, and microphones.  [..] 
Reality: 
Not used in GS/MO environments. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select control (not applicable to the GS/MO environment).   
 
Comment:   
Mission/project personnel can collaborate using non-mission devices. 
Session Authenticity 
(SC-23) 
NIST: 
The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control addresses communications protections at the session, versus packet 
level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based 
services) and establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications 
sessions in ongoing identities of other parties and in the validity of information 
transmitted.  Authenticity protection includes, for example, protecting against 
man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false information 
into sessions. 
Reality: 
Some of the web applications in use within the GS/MO environment utilize self-
signed Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificates. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Self-signed SSL certificates OK as clients are generally in the same LAN as the 
web servers, and so the web server identities do not need to be verified by a 
Certification Authority (CA). 
Protection of Information at 
Rest 
(SC-28) 
NIST: 
The information system protects the [confidentiality | integrity] of [organization-
defined information at rest]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information at rest and 
covers user information and system information.  Information at rest refers to the 
state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components 
of information systems.  [..] 
Reality: 
Most GS/MO devices are multi-user devices in multi-user environments; no 
mobile computing in general. 
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Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Control only applicable to removable devices (e.g., USB thumbdrives) that require 
FIPS 140-2 validation. 
 
 
PRIVACY 
Privacy Impact and Risk 
Assessment 
(AR-02) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Documents and implements a privacy risk management 
process that assesses privacy risk to individuals resulting from the collection, 
sharing, storing, transmitting, use, and disposal of personally identifiable 
information (PII); and (b) conducts Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) for 
information systems, programs, or other activities that pose a privacy risk in 
accordance with applicable law, OMB policy, or any existing organizational 
policies and procedures. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizational privacy risk management processes operate across the life cycles of 
all mission/business processes that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of PII.  
[..] 
Reality:   
In most cases, the ground system does not handle any private (personal) 
information. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
This is often an organizational control; elements may still be required to document 
whether private information is handled or not.  If organization maintains a multi-
mission SSP, this and other privacy controls should be tailored for all 
missions/projects. 
 
C. Maintenance and Monitoring 
 
AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Auditable Events 
(AU-02) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Determines that the information system is capable of 
auditing the following events:  [organization-defined auditable events]; (b) 
coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring 
audit-related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the 
selection of auditable events; (c) provides a rationale for why the auditable events 
are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security 
incidents; and (d) determines that the following events are to be audited within the 
information system:  [organization-defined audited events (the subset of the 
auditable events defined in AU-02a) along with the frequency of (or situation 
requiring) auditing for each identified event]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information system.  
Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and 
relevant to the security of information systems and the environments in which 
those systems operate in order to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. [..] 
Reality:   
Many of the GS/MO devices run Linux/UNIX operating systems. 
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Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
If running default syslog service on Linux/UNIX and MacOS, the majority of the 
required auditable events are already enabled.  Not applicable to Windows and 
application logging. 
Response to Audit 
Processing Failures 
(AU-05) 
NIST: 
The information system:  (a) Alerts [organization-defined personnel or roles] in 
the event of an audit processing failure; and (b) takes the following additional 
actions:  [organizational-defined actions to be taken (e.g., shutdown information 
system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records)]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors, failures 
in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or 
exceeded. [..] 
Reality: 
By design, mail service is disabled within GS/MO elements, but it is required to 
process mail in order to send notifications.  Unless the service is enabled, and 
packets allowed through, individuals cannot be alerted. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
If mail service can be enabled, then automated notifications can be sent to security 
or support personnel; else, if it cannot be enabled, a compensating control could 
include daily review of audit logs. 
 
 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
Security Assessments 
(CA-02) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Develops a security assessment plan that describes the 
scope of the assessment including:  (1) security controls and control enhancements 
under assessment; (2) assessment procedures to be used to determine security 
control effectiveness; and (3) assessment environment, assessment team, and 
assessment roles and responsibilities; (b) assesses the security controls in the 
information system and its environment of operation [organization-defined 
frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented 
correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect 
to meeting established security requirements; (c) produces a security assessment 
report that documents the results of the assessment; and (d) provides the results of 
the security control assessment to [organization-defined individuals or roles]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations assess security controls in organizational information systems and 
the environments in which those systems operate as part of (i) initial and ongoing 
security authorizations; (ii) FISMA annual assessments; (iii) continuous 
monitoring; (iv) system development life cycle activities. [..] 
Reality:   
Not all elements consider internal security assessments during their development. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Initiate internal security assessments during the development of the GS/MO 
elements. 
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Penetration Testing 
(CA-08) 
NIST: 
The organization conducts penetration testing [organization-defined frequency] on 
[organization-defined information systems or system components]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on information 
systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be 
exploited by adversaries.  [..] 
Reality:   
Most missions/projects supporting GS/MO are categorized as MODERATE 
systems.  Penetration testing is not required for MODERATE systems. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Elements should consider conducting penetration testing during development and 
prior to operations.  After operations, no penetration testing; instead, focus on 
monitoring and awareness training. 
 
Comment:   
The deviation, in this case, is to implement a security control that is required for 
HIGH rated systems. 
 
 
MAINTENANCE 
System Maintenance Policy 
and Procedures 
(MA-01) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Develops, documents, and disseminates to [organization-
defined personnel or roles]:  (1) a system maintenance policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination 
among organizational entities, and compliance; and (2) procedures to facilitate the 
implementation of the system maintenance policy and associated system 
maintenance controls; and (b) reviews and updates the current: (1) system 
maintenance policy [organization-defined frequency]; and (2) system maintenance 
procedures [organization-defined frequency]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
This controls addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the 
effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in 
the MA family.  [..] 
Reality:   
Successful missions often live long past their expected life, and their budgets 
remain limited or even decrease over the years.  In order for the science aspect of 
the mission be prolonged, mission/project support and support personnel are 
phased out including system support. 
 
Also, certain processes such as documentation development are not followed since 
the personnel supporting the element are often “veteran” professionals having 
worked on previous missions. 
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Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Mission management must be prepared to ensure the information technology 
supporting the mission keeps up with advances in technology.  By keeping 
hardware and software updated, risks related to obsolesce are avoided.  Potential 
problems include lack of funding for maintenance, technology refreshes, and 
support personnel for maintaining the information systems. 
 
About the lack of documentation (e.g., procedural documents) by seasoned 
support personnel, if there is low turnover of management and support staff, then 
the risk of not documenting certain procedures need to be reviewed, analyzed, 
documented and accepted.  Tailoring, in this case, may not be helpful. 
 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
Vulnerability Scanning 
(RA-05) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and 
hosted applications [organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in 
accordance with organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities 
potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported; (b) 
employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability 
among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using 
standards for:  (1) enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper 
configurations; (2) formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) measuring 
vulnerability impact; (c) analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from 
security control assessments; (d) remediates legitimate vulnerabilities 
[organization-defined response times] in accordance with an organizational 
assessment of risk; and (e) shares information obtained from the vulnerability 
scanning process and security control assessments with [organization-defined 
personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information 
systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies). 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and 
comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. [..] 
Reality:   
Due to the nature of mission operations, GS/MO devices may not be capable of 
being scanned at the same pace as their general computing counterparts.  
Likewise, they are not patched as often since a more comprehensive risk analysis 
as well as testing are needed prior to the deployment of patches and updates.   
 
Some elements perform non-credentialed scanning only. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Align vulnerability management with patch management processes.  Credentialed 
vulnerability scanning is a must.  Although technically feasible, centralized 
vulnerability scanning of all ground system elements is usually not performed (the 
scans are done locally).  Multi-Mission Operations Centers (MMOC) should 
consider sharing resources such as vulnerability scanners, especially if the same 
personnel supports other missions. 
 
Comments: 
Each mission has its own schedule.  Scanning should not be performed during, for 
instance, a spacecraft pass. 
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SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY 
Flaw Remediation 
(SI-02) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws; 
(b) tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for 
effectiveness and potential side effects before installation; (c) installs security-
relevant software and firmware updates within [organization-defined time period] 
of the release of the updates; and (d) incorporates flaw remediation into the 
organizational configuration management process. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations identify information systems affected by announced software flaws 
including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this 
information to designated organizational personnel with information security 
responsibilities.  Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, 
service packs, hot fixes, and anti-virus signatures.  [..] 
Reality:   
Due to the nature of mission operations, GS/MO devices may not be capable of 
being patched at the same pace as their general computing counterparts.  A more 
comprehensive risk analysis as well as testing are needed prior to the deployment 
of patches and updates.   
 
Some mission assets cannot be patched/updated since they were built to simulate 
the software that is currently running on the spacecraft.   
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Tailor the control to perform patching/updates at an interval that will not impact 
the mission.  Compensating control may include strong configuration management 
processes. 
 
If patches cannot be deployed at least monthly, then every other month or every 
quarter.  Because of the volume of patches/updates that accumulate each month, 
waiting longer than a quarter to deploy the patch is not advisable.  The patch 
frequency tailored for GS/MO devices should also be coordinated with 
vulnerability assessment cadence so that the devices are scanned right after they 
are patched for more accurate results.  Also, it is important to perform more 
extensively any testing before (and after) patching operational systems. 
 
For assets that cannot be updated, missions must identify and document 
compensating controls that offer protection to these vulnerable systems.  
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
22 
Malicious Code Protection 
(SI-03) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at 
information system entry and exist points to detect and eradicate malicious code; 
(b) updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are 
available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and 
procedures; (c) configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:  (1) Perform 
periodic scans of the information system [organization-defined frequency] and 
real-time scans of files from external sources at [endpoint | network entry/exit 
points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with 
organizational security policy; and (2) [block malicious code | quarantine 
malicious code | send alert to administrator | [organization-defined action]] in 
response to malicious code detection; and (d) addresses the receipt of false 
positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting 
potential impact on the availability of the information system. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic 
mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, 
notebook computers, and mobile devices.  Malicious code includes, for example, 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. [..] 
Reality:   
Many of the GS/MO devices runs Linux/UNIX operating systems.  There is a 
perception that there is little value of running anti-virus software on these systems. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
There are viruses and worms for all computing platforms including mobile 
devices.  On Linux/UNIX systems, most of the malware are only effective if the 
systems are running vulnerable software.  If the elements keep the systems up-to-
date with the latest patches/updates, the likelihood of these systems from 
becoming infected is very low.  The fact that these systems are segregated 
logically and physically with controlled access drops the probability of infection to 
even lower levels. 
 
Even if auto-protection (aka., on-access virus scanning) is not available on these 
systems, elements may consider tailoring the control to waive the frequent full 
scanning, especially if files do not change often.  As a result, unnecessary 
processes (e.g., weekly full virus scans) wearing out media storage (disks) will be 
avoided. 
Spam Protection 
(SI-08) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Employs spam protection mechanisms at information 
system entry and exit points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages; and 
(b) updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in 
accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Information system entry and exist points include, for example, firewalls, 
electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, 
workstations, mobile devices, and notebook/laptop computers.  [..] 
Reality: 
By design, mail service is disabled within GS/MO elements.  If the service is 
enabled then access to the server is restricted. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
De-select this control is mail service is not enabled.  If it is, ensure that the service 
only listens to the localhost (assuming service is enabled for internal use only). 
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D. Management and Support 
 
AWARENESS AND TRAINING 
Role-Based Security 
Training 
(AT-03) 
NIST: 
The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned 
security roles and responsibilities; (a) before authorizing access to the information 
system or performing assigned duties; (b) when required by information system 
changes; and (c) [organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the 
assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security 
requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel 
have authorized access. [..] 
Reality:   
Mission/project personnel assuming specific roles are not always trained 
(sometimes there are no training requirements for certain roles). 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
System Administrators, Account Administrators, Developers, Database 
Administrators, Network Administrators, Security Administrators (ISSEs), 
Security Managers (ISSOs), Information System Owners (ISOs) should all take 
role-based security training at least once every 3 years. 
 
Comments:   
For missions on extended life, there is often a reduction in staff including IT 
support.  As a result, support staff may take on IT and/or IT security roles which 
the staff may or may not be qualified (risk). 
Role-Based Security 
Training 
(AT-03) 
NIST: 
The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned 
security roles and responsibilities; (a) before authorizing access to the information 
system or performing assigned duties; (b) when required by information system 
changes; and (c) [organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the 
assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security 
requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel 
have authorized access. [..] 
Reality: 
Some organizations require personnel with specific roles (e.g., System 
Administrators) to take annual refresher training using static and often old 
materials. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Because many of the specialized personnel are qualified personnel who are 
proficient in their craft, the annual requirement could be modified so that the 
refresher is only required every 3 years. 
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CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
Alternate Processing Site 
(CP-07) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary 
agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of [organization-defined 
information system operations] for essential missions/business functions within 
[organization-defined time period consistent with recovery time and recovery 
point objectives] when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable; (b) 
ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are 
available at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support 
delivery to the site within the organization-defined time period for 
transfer/resumption; and (c) ensures that the alternate processing site provides 
information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary 
processing sites.  An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the 
event that the primary processing site is not available. 
Reality:   
Depending on the class of the mission, elements may or may not have an alternate 
processing site, that is, a backup site.  In many cases, there are no alternate 
processing sites. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
If an alternate processing site does not exist, then the element must ensure its 
configuration management and contingency planning processes addresses many of 
the concerns related to element availability.  The important of an alternate storage 
site increases when a backup site does not exist or is not available. 
Information System Backup 
(CP-09) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the 
information system [organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time 
and recovery point objectives]; (b) conducts backups of system-level information 
contained in the information system [organization-defined frequency consistent 
with recovery time and recovery point objectives]; (c) conducts backups of 
information system documentation including security-related documentation 
[organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point 
objectives]; and (d) protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
backup information at storage locations. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, 
operating system and application software, and licenses.  User-level information 
includes any information other than system-level information.  [..] 
Reality: 
Many organizations place emphasis on having hot sites for their key elements 
(e.g., mission operations centers); however, when hot sites do not exist, CP is 
often “dismissed.” The only remaining protective measure seems to be data 
backups. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Backups are important, and must be performed whether an alternate processing 
site exists or not.  They should be part of the CM process in case data is to be 
restored after a failed change to the system. 
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INCIDENT RESPONSE 
Incident Reporting 
(IR-06) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to 
the organizational incident response capability within [organization-defined time 
period]; and (b) reports security incident information to [organization-defined 
authorities]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting 
requirements within an organization and the formal incident reporting 
requirements for federal agencies and their subordinate organizations.  [..] 
Reality:   
Each element has its own incident reporting process, and not unified response line 
(for the ground system). 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Ensure the Ground System ISSO is added to the IR process. 
 
 
PLANNING 
System Security Plan 
(PL-02) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Develops a security plan for the information system [..]; (b) 
distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to 
the plan to [organization-defined personnel or roles]; (c) reviews the security plan 
for the information system [organization-defined frequency]; (d) updates the plan 
to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or 
problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; 
and (e) protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls and control 
enhancements.  Security plans also describe, at a high level, how the security 
controls and control enhancements meet those security requirements, but do not 
provide detailed, technical descriptions of the specific design or implementation of 
the controls/enhancements.  [..] 
Reality:   
Some organizations support multiple missions/projects, but each has its own SSP 
and defined values (parameters), sometimes differing from each other’s 
implementation. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Elements whose operators support multiple missions/projects should consider 
creating a single system security plan (SSP) for all missions/projects, especially if 
the missions/projects share the same resources (physical location, support 
personnel, infrastructure, IT assets, etc.).  This also helps reduce assessment and 
authorization (A&A) costs. 
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PERSONNEL SECURITY 
Personnel Screening 
(PS-03) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the 
information system; and (b) rescreens individuals according to [organization-
defined conditions requiring rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, 
the frequency of such rescreening]. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federal laws, 
Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and 
specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. 
Reality:   
Some (non-NASA) organizations offer resistance in screening their personnel. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Personnel screening is an important aspect of personnel security.  While 
background checks may or may not be indicative of personnel security and 
trustworthiness, all personnel requiring access to mission networks are required by 
NASA to undergo a basic background check.15 
 
 
SYSTEM AND SERVICE ACQUISITION 
Allocation of Resources 
(SA-02) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Determines information security requirements for the 
information system or information system service in mission/business process 
planning;  (b) determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to 
protect the information systems or information system service as part of its capital 
planning and investment control processes; and (c) establishes a discrete line item 
for information security in organizational programming and budgeting 
documentation. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial 
information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the 
sustainment of the system/service. 
Reality:   
Legacy missions/projects, that is, missions on extended life have minimum 
funding to continue their science operations.  Unfortunately, the budget for these 
missions may not be enough to cover the expenses related to information 
technology. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
The tailoring of the control is for legacy missions only.  Identify all controls that 
cannot be implemented by a limited-funded mission/project, and document the 
deviations in the SSP. 
                                                          
15   National Agency Check with Inquiries (NAC-I) 
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System Development Life 
Cycle 
(SA-03) 
NIST: 
The organization:  (a) Manages the information system using [organization-
defined system development life cycle] that incorporates information security 
considerations; (b) defines and documents information security roles and 
responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle; (c) identifies 
individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and (d) 
integrates the organizational information security risk management process into 
system development life cycle activities. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for the 
successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational 
information systems.  [..] 
Reality: 
Throughout the development phases of the mission, projects go through various 
milestone reviews which allow NASA to learn the development status of the 
various aspects of the project, and of course verify that the requirements for a 
specific milestone review are being satisfied.  Current project milestone review 
requirements for IT security focus mostly on security documents.   
Projects/missions naturally place emphasis on security documentation, not 
necessarily on security processes (e.g., one-time vulnerability scans vs. continuous 
monitoring).  While IT security documentation is a required necessity to support 
certain managed processes, the check-the-box review approach does not provide 
any benefit to the mission/project unless the core of the documentation, that is, the 
actual contents, is reviewed and scrutinized. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
In addition to meeting all project milestone review criteria, missions/projects 
should consider reporting on the status of other IT risk management processes as 
well. 
Security Engineering 
Principles 
(SA-08) 
NIST: 
The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the 
specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the 
information system. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new development 
information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades.  [..] 
Reality: 
A&A is needed, and must be considered by design to avoid delays and additional 
costs down the road.   
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Pay special attention to the organizational frequency of A&A so projects can 
budget accordingly. 
 
 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Insider Threat Program 
(PM-12) 
NIST: 
The organization implements an insider threat program that includes a cross-
discipline insider threat incident handling team. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Organizations handling classified information are required, under Executive Order 
13587 and the National Policy on Insider Threat, to establish insider threat 
programs. [..] 
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Reality:   
By design, the ground system and mission operations architecture offer layered 
security, especially for protecting critical elements such as mission operations 
centers, but all these layers of security aim at protecting the ground system from 
external threats.  Organizations supporting the ground system may not have a 
formal and mature insider threat program (unless the organization is supporting 
Department of Defense projects, in which case they are required to establish an 
insider threat program).  This control is part of the Program Management (PM) 
control family which is not always addressed by individual elements. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Organizations operating ground system elements should consider establishing an 
insider threat program to further protect the elements of the ground system. 
 
Comment:   
It might be possible to establish a ground system-wide insider threat program.  If 
elements of the ground system do not have one in place, it may be more cost-
effective to create one for the ground system in general. 
Threat Awareness Program 
(PM-06) 
NIST: 
The organization implements a threat awareness program that includes a cross-
organization information-sharing capability. 
 
NIST supplemental guidance: 
Because of constantly changing and increasing sophistication of adversaries, 
especially the advanced persistent threat (APT), it is becoming more likely that 
adversaries may successfully breach or compromise organizational information 
systems.  [..] 
Reality: 
Current information security and privacy awareness training programs may 
address APTs, but only superficially. 
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: 
Consider establishing a threat awareness program, perhaps in conjunction with 
existing information security and privacy awareness training programs. 
 
 It is important to note that not all tailoring will be accepted or approved by the organization, especially when 
little or no organizational tolerance for deviations from standard (enterprise) implementation exists. 
 
VI. Enterprise IT Security 
 
Standardized IT solutions aim to be deployed in mass, covering as many divisions and departments as possible.  
The less customization and deviation from the standards the better and easier for the organization to verify 
implementation and compliance.  As deployments are customized and tailored for certain environments, the 
organization must keep track of changes, and assume a different posture when assessing the tailored implementation.  
That is why there is often organizational resistance in permitting the customization of these deployments, including 
the selection, tailoring and scoping of the baseline security controls.  One size does not fits all. 
 
To date, FISMA attempted to apply baselined security controls across the federal government to standardize the 
management of information security.  It took on a one size fits all approach, but gave agencies enough leeway to 
tailor the baselined controls so they better fit the business environments in which these agencies operate in.  With 
the update to FISMA in 2014, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), an amendment to the 
2002 Act, designated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the responsibility and authority to administer 
agency information security policies and practices.  One of the outcomes from this update is the Continuous 
Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. 
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The CDM program being deployed across the federal government remains consistent with the one size fits all 
philosophy, and aims at the enterprise as a whole.  Among the initiatives that are part of this program is the 
employment of automated tools to perform “periodic risk assessments, testing of security procedures, and detecting, 
reporting, and responding to security incidents.”16  Highly specialized systems such as NASA’s ground systems and 
mission operations are included under the CDM program, that is, are required to meet the requirements for the 
assessment and reporting of security (or lack thereof).  Certainly, a thorough review of the security impact of the 
deployment of CDM sensors17 on these highly specialized systems must be performed to prevent risks and/or impact 
to missions/projects.  Over the years, missions/projects have developed internal processes to ensure that mission 
operations are not impacted by day-to-day IT management and IT security activities.  The work that NASA does is 
sponsored by U.S. taxpayers, and as such, the Agency must be diligent in ensuring that the investment that it does on 
its missions is protected.   
VII. Conclusion 
 
Security audits are conducted not only to ensure that requirements are met (compliance verification) but also to 
identify problems, especially recurring problems, and their root causes so they can be prevented in the future.  As we 
observe these recurring problems across multiple organizations, we the authors feel the professional responsibility to 
help the aeronautics and astronautics community address common issues affecting specifically the implementation 
and assessment of security controls.  Most of these issues are caused by the improper selection of the security 
controls, in particular the lack of tailoring of the security controls to ensure that the controls fit the ground system 
(and mission operations) environment.  By compiling a set of security controls based on their candidacy for tailoring 
into a single list, we believe we can assist current and future elements and organizations in (a) analyzing the 
applicability of security controls; (b) identifying deviations from the baselines; (c) identifying compensating controls 
for each deviation; and (d) document the tailored controls in the SSP.  This list is not a recipe for customizing the 
baseline controls for the ground system, especially because each environment is unique.  So unique it should not be 
treated the same as the rest of the enterprise.  We hope we can provide insight to Information System Owners as 
they take this important step of the security life cycle.18 
 
                                                          
16   Excerpt from the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Public Law 113-283, 113th Congress 
[online],  URL:  https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ283/PLAW-113publ283.pdf [retrieved 15 August 2016] 
17   CDM tools that collect information from devices, and report the information to a centralized report server 
(Federal Dashboard). 
18   NIST Risk Management Framework, NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
30 
Appendix A:  Acronyms 
 
(ISC)2   International Information System Security Certification Consortium  
A&A   Assessment and Authorization 
AC   Access Control (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
ACSO   Alternate Computer Security Official 
APT   Advanced Persistent Threat 
AT    Awareness and Training  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
ATO   Authorization To Operate 
AU   Audit and Accountability  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
BSU   Bowie State University 
C&C   Command and Control 
CA   Certification Authority 
    Security Assessment and Authorization   (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
CCB   Change Control Board 
CDM   Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation 
CISSP   Certified Information System Security Professional 
CISTO  Computational and Information Sciences and Technology Office 
CM   Configuration Management  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
CP    Contingency Planning  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
CPC   Climate Prediction Center 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
FIPS   Federal Information Processing Standard 
FISMA  Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
    Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 
FTP   File Transfer Protocol 
GDMS  General Dynamics Mission Systems 
GS    Ground System 
GSFC   Goddard Space Flight Center 
HSPD-12  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 
IA    Identification and Authentication  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
IEEE   Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IP    Internet Protocol 
IR    Incident Response  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
IT    Information Technology 
ITF   Instrument Team Facility 
ISO   Information System Owner 
ISSE   Information System Security Engineer 
ISSO   Information System Security Officer  
JHU   Johns Hopkins University 
LACS   Logical Access Control System 
LAN   Local Area Network 
LDCM  Landsat Data Continuity Mission 
MA   Maintenance  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
MAVEN  Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN 
MMOC  Multi-Mission Operations Center 
MO   Mission Operations 
MOC   Mission Operations Center 
MOE   Mission Operations Element 
MP   Media Protection  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
MU-SPIN  Minority University-SPace Interdisciplinary Network 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCEP   National Centers for Environmental Prediction 
NIST   National Institutes of Standards and Technology 
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NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NPP   NPOESS Preparatory Project 
ODV   Organization-Defined Value 
OMB   Office of Management and Budget 
OSIRIS-REx Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security, Regolith Explorer 
PACS   Physical Access Control System 
PE    Physical and Environmental Protection  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
PEAP   Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol 
PIA   Privacy Impact Analysis 
PIV   Personal Identification Verification 
PL    Planning  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
PM   Program Management  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
    Project Manager 
PS    Personnel Security  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
RA   Risk Assessment  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
RMF   Risk Management Framework 
SA    System Administrator 
    System and Services Acquisition  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
SBU   Sensitive But Unclassified 
SC    System and Communications Protection  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
SCAP   Security Content Automation Protocol 
SESDA  Sciences and Exploration Data Analysis 
SI    System and Information Integrity  (NIST 800-53 security control family) 
SIA   Security Impact Analysis 
SOC   Science Operations Center 
SP    Special Publication 
SSL    Secure Socket Layer 
SSMO   Space Science Mission Operations 
SSP    System Security Plan 
TCP   Transfer Control Protocol 
TESS   Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite 
TLS   Transport Layer Security 
UHF   Ultra High Frequency 
UI    User Interface 
US    United States 
USB   Universal Serial Bus 
USGCB  United States Government Configuration Baseline 
VHF   Very High Frequency 
WebUI  Web User Interface 
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